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ii.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by their attorney, Scott L Wyatt, Cache County
Attorney, and tenders their Appellee Brief in this appeal pursuant to Rule 24 U.R.A.P. as
follows:

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT:
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a3(2)(d) and (f), (1953 as amended). Pursuant to Rule 4 U.R.A.P. the Court has transferred
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:
First Issue: Trooper Denney had a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe the
Defendant had committed an offence or was about to commit an offence when he seized the
Defendant.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The standard of review for this case is correctly set out in the defendant's brief on
page 2. The State has no argument with the standard and therefore simply restates it here as
follows: "The legal standard . . . bestows a measure of discretion to the trial court in the
application of the correctness standard to a given set of facts. State v. Chapman, 295 Utah
Adv. Rep. 19 (1996), citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Legal determination of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause is reviewed de novo whereas underlying facts are
reviewed for clear error. Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App.) Cert. Denied
925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996)."
1

GOVERNING STATUTES:
A copy of the following statute cited herein is included in the Addendum to this
Brief:
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-118, (1953 as amended)

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ACTS:
1.

The defendant was driving on a highway without his light being on at
approximately 9:20 p.m. on June 9, 1996.

2.

Trooper Denny pulled the defendant over because he believed the defendant
should have had his lights on according to Utah law. The specific facts upon
which Trooper Denny relied are set forth in detail below.

3.

While conversing with the defendant, during the stop of his vehicle, Trooper
Denny detected evidence of further criminal activity, namely, DUI and Open
Container of Alcohol in Vehicle.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant was convicted below by a jury of his peers for the misdemeanor
crimes: DUI and Open Container of Alcohol in a Vehicle. The only question relating to that
conviction complained of by the defendant in his brief to this appellate court is the legality of
the stop by Trooper Denny. Admittedly, it is the stop that lead the Trooper to evidence that
resulted in the defendant's arrest and subsequent conviction. The defendant argues in Point I
of his brief that the stop was a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment; the State agrees and
here offers no argument to the contrary. But the defendant further claims in Point II that
2

Trooper Denny did not have a legal basis for the stop; on this point the state disagrees and
provides its argument for the same below. Trooper Denny did have an "articulable
suspicion" that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. In his Point III
the defendant argues that "the trial court misconstrued the clear definition of sunset and
horizon." While the State maintains the court did not so misconstrue, it is a completely
immaterial point for this appeal. The state sets forth its reasons below. The final point in
defendant's brief, Point IV is the simple statement that if the stop was illegal the resulting
evidence should be suppressed. The State has no disagreement here; however, the stop was
not illegal-the evidence should not be suppressed.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TIME OF "SUNSET" AND THE DEFINITION OF "HORIZON" IS
IMMATERIAL TO THIS APPEAL.

The defendant complains that the court misconstrued the definition of "horizon" and
the time of "sunset" in its Memorandum Decision. What the defendant fails to state in his
argument is the simple fact that this definition and time provided no significant basis for the
trial court's opinion.
U.C.A. §41-6-118 requires the defendant to have his headlights on if one of two
conditions exist. The first condition relates to a black-letter rule with sunrise and sunset
times but the second condition, independent of the first, is simply based on "insufficient light
or unfavorable atmospheric conditions." There are a variety of causes, independent or acting
in conjunction with sunset or dusk, that would lead to a condition requiring the use of
3

headlights, namely: cloud cover, fog, precipitation, dust storm, etc. A quick reading of the
court's Memorandum Decision reveals that the technical discussion by the court of "sunset"
or "horizon" was dicta except that it acknowledged the darkening of the sky. The courts
opinion, as written, was "based on Denny's judgment that [the defendant's] vehicle was not
clearly discernible at a distance of 1,000 feet because of insufficient l i g h t . . . . " See page 5
of the Decision.
The State suggests here that the court was completely correct in its conclusion about
the time of sunset and conditions caused by the Wellsville Mountains in Cache County. And
further that the Decision correctly analyzes the statute.

II.

TROOPER DENNY HAD A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION
FOR HIS STOP OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE.

The defendant maintains, in his brief, that Trooper Denny did not stop the defendant
for a suspected violation of state law but rather "espoused altruistic motives wholly divorced
from law enforcement." This is a blatant misconstruction of the testimony.
Trooper Denny did testify, when called and questioned by the defense, that he
stopped the defendant "as a courtesy stop." But no further question was asked by the defense
as follow up to inquire what Trooper Denny was thinking by his word "courtesy." It is
common knowledge that law enforcement officers pull motorists over to apprize them that
they are braking a law and simply "warn" them to correct the problem or deficiency. This
could have been what was intended, because during cross-examination by the State's
attorney, Trooper Denny provided further testimony to help the finder of fact understand his
thinking. Trooper Denny testified that in his judgment (1) "I needed my headlights on so
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that other vehicles would see me." (Transcript, page 10 lines 16-17.) (2) "The other vehicles
around me had their headlights on. The traffic that was passing me they all had their
headlights on." (T, p. 10 1.17-19.) (3) "When Mr. Nelson's car passed me, his was the only
vehicle that did not have its headlights on. He was difficult to see because of the other
headlights coming; and then, to have his not be on. It made it even more difficult to see him,
so that's why I flashed." (T, p. 10 1.20-24.)
Trooper Denny was then asked about the lighting conditions at the time. He testified
that (4) "the sun had set. I was facing east, so there was some - 1 was looking into the
shadows. There were some shadows coming across the road right there. There were a few
clouds across the horizon, which were to my back. It was dark enough that you could not
distinguish his car from where I saw him originally." (T, p.l 1 1.5-10.)
Taking into account the shadows, clouds and sunset, and directly on point with the
requirements of the statute, the State's attorney questioned Trooper Denny about whether the
defendant's vehicle was "clearly discernible" from a distance of 1,000 feet.
Question:

About how far away did you see him?

Answer:

It was approximately 800 feet. At a later date I went out with a tape
measure, or a roller meter, and I measured the distance from where I
was stopped to the intersection at 1200 East. It was roughly 800 feet.

Question:

Was it more or less than 800?

Answer:

It was less.

Question:

And so what were the conditions like - what was the visibility like at
approximately a thousand feet?

Answer:

It would have been very hard to see. At a thousand feet you would
5

have had to gone past the intersection to the east side and you would
have to go to approximately the second telephone pole on the east side
of the intersection, which would have been extremely difficult to see a
car.
(T,p.l 11.11-25.)
It was Trooper Denny's opinion that under the standards set forth in U.C.A. §41-6118 the defendant was required to have his headlights on and that by not having his
headlights on he was violating the code.
As the defendant points out in his brief (page 5) the Trooper does not need to prove a
crime was actually committed, or even that he had probable cause to believe a crime had
been committed, but simply that the Trooper "has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person
has committed or is about to commit a crime . . . . " In other words, an ultimate finding that
the defendant did not actually violate the law is not dispositive. The issue is whether the
officer can articulate a reasonable suspicion that the motorist was committing or about to
commit a traffic offense. The trial court correctly understood this and so found. In the
memorandum decision the trial court correctly stated:
Nelson's position is that no traffic violation occurred and, therefore, the stop
by Denny was constitutionally unjustified. This position is erroneous and is
considered in the body of the memorandum. However, the State, in its response to
Nelson, argues, correctly, that an observed violation is not required in order for the
stop to be constitutionally permitted. Stopping a vehicle is also justified if a trooper
"suspects that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic
and equipment regulations.'" State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)
6

(quoting Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 661, 59 L.Ed. 2d 660, 99 S.Ct. 1391
(1979). According to the Utah Supreme Court, therefore, a stop is "justified when [a
trooper] has 'reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic
offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a license ..
. [or that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting
drugs."' Id. (Quoting State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 1992)
(emphasis added).
Memorandum Decision, page 3 footnote 1.
As set forth in the section on Standard of Review, this Appellate Court, then, here
reviews the factually determination of the trial court for "clear error." The trial court below
found, at the suppression hearing, based on the above, not just that the Trooper had
reasonable suspicion, not just that he had probable cause but that the defendant was actually
in violation of the statute. See Memorandum Decision, page 5. The jury's subsequent
conclusion that they were not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt
of the headlight violation does not undo the officers "reasonable suspicion" at the time of the
stop. The trial court did not commit clear error in finding the underlying facts; and the law
set forth by the trial court is not incorrect. Therefore, this appellate court should not reverse
the trial court's order.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court found that Trooper Denny had more than a reasonable suspicion that
the defendant was violating or about to violate a Utah traffic law. The trial court's
conclusion was correct according to law and not clearly in error according to the facts.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this court uphold the decision of the court below.
DATED this

^^day of May, 1998.

Sco
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ADDENDUM:

41-6-118. Lights and illuminating devices — Duty to
display — Time.
(a) Every vehicle upon a highway within this state at any
time from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise
and at any other time when, due to insufficient light or
unfavorable atmospheric conditions, persons and vehicles on
the highway are not clearly discernible at a distance of 1,000
feet ahead shall display lighted lamps and other lamps and
illuminating devices as respectively required for different
classes of vehicles, subject to exceptions with respect to parked
vehicles, and further that stop lights, turn signals and other
signaling devices shall be lighted as prescribed for the use of
such devices.
(b) Whenever requirement is hereinafter declared as to
distance from which certain lamps and devices shall render
objects visible or within which such lamps or devices shall be
visible, said provisions shall apply during the times stated in
Subsection (a) in respect to a vehicle without load when upon
a straight, level, unlighted highway under normal atmospheric conditions, unless a different time or condition is
expressly stated.
(c) Whenever requirement is hereinafter declared as to the
mounted height of lamps or devices it shall mean from the
center of such lamp or device to the level ground upon which
the vehicle stands when such vehicle is without a load.
1979
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